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Abstract
Timing channels are information flows, encoded in the
relative timing of events, that bypass the system’s pro-
tection mechanisms. Any microarchitectural state that
depends on execution history and affects the rate of
progress of later executions potentially establishes a tim-
ing channel, unless explicit steps are taken to close it.
Such state includes CPU caches, TLBs, branch predic-
tors and prefetchers; removing the channels requires that
the OS can partition such state or flush it on a switch of
security domains. We measure the capacities of chan-
nels based on these microarchitectural features on sev-
eral generations of processors across the two mainstream
ISAs, x86 and ARM, and investigate the effectiveness of
the flushing mechanisms provided by the respective ISA.
We find that in all processors we studied, at least one
significant channel remains. This implies that closing
all timing channels seems impossible on contemporary
mainstream processors.
1 Introduction
Computer hardware is increasingly being shared between
multiple, potentially untrusted, programs. Examples of
such sharing range from cloud services, where a sin-
gle computer may share workloads of multiple clients,
to mobile phones that run apps authored by different
developers, to web browsers executing Javascript code
originating from different sites. To protect confidential
or private information that some of these programs may
access, the system imposes a security policy that is de-
signed to prevent information flow between different se-
curity domains (eg. VMs, apps or web pages).
One long-established threat to the security of shared
systems are covert channels [27], which allow colluding
programs to bypass the security policy, by transferring
information over media that are not controlled by the sys-
tem. A typical scenario includes two programs: a Trojan
program as the sender, which has access to sensitive in-
formation but is confined [30] by the security policy (i.e.
prevented from sending information to arbitrary destina-
tions), and a spy program as the receiver, which does not
have access to the sensitive information but can commu-
nicate with less restrictions.
Traditionally, covert channels were considered mainly
in the context of military-grade multi-level secure sys-
tems [11, 28]. However, with the spread of cloud plat-
forms and the proliferation of untrusted mobile code, in-
cluding mobile-phone apps and third-party code running
in web browsers, covert channels are becoming a main-
stream security problem. Colluding mobile apps present
a concrete example of the risk: Consider an app which
operates on sensitive private data and is denied network
access to prevent it from leaking the data. Such an app
(Trojan) could use a covert channel to leak to a separate
app (spy), which has unrestricted network access but no
direct access to sensitive data. Similarly, a cloud-based
web service might contain a Trojan which leaks secret
data to a co-located spy VM, circumventing the encryp-
tion of client-server traffic.
Covert channels are usually classified as either stor-
age or timing channels [43]. Storage channels represent
information as some system state affected by the sender
that can be sensed by the receiver, frequently exploiting
operating system (OS) metadata as the storage medium.
Past research has demonstrated that storage channels can
be eliminated completely [36].
Here we focus on the open problem of timing chan-
nels, which exploit timing variations for communication.
They are harder to deal with, partially because of the
breadth of exploitable mechanisms. For example, secret-
dependent code paths or data access patterns can lead to
timing variations that can be exploited locally [37, 51]
or even remotely [6], and the usual defence is to strive
for deterministic execution time via constant-time algo-
rithms [7].
Such timing channels are arguably a problem of user-
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level software, although OS mechanisms may be em-
ployed to ensure deterministic timing of externally-
visible effects [5, 9, 10]. However, there are other classes
of timing channels that clearly fall into the responsibil-
ity of the OS.1 This specifically includes timing channels
resulting from microarchitectural state, such as caches,
that is not explicitly exposed to user-level software. Such
channels, from now on simply referred to as microarchi-
tectural channels, are the topic of this paper.
Specifically, we examine the degree to which it is
possible to prevent microarchitectural timing channels
on contemporary hardware. Timing channels between
concurrent executions on a single core (i.e. simultane-
ous multithreading, SMT) are well-documented and un-
derstood [4], are high-bandwidth, and are probably im-
possible to close, so we assume a security-conscious
OS that disables SMT. We further restrict our exami-
nation to intra-core timing channels, i.e. between time-
multiplexed users of a single core.
One might assume that elimination of microarchitec-
tural channels in this restricted scenario would be triv-
ially (although expensively) achieved by flushing all mi-
croarchitectural state on each switch of security context.
However, as we will demonstrate, this assumption is
wrong on contemporary mainstream hardware, and sig-
nificant channels remain despite the best efforts of the
OS. In short, our findings mean that contemporary
processors are inherently insecure, as they cannot be
prevented from leaking information.
We make the following contributions:
• We implement covert channels attacking all known
caching microarchitectural features (Section 4.1),
and identify and implement all known mitiga-
tion techniques for those channels that do not
depend on undocumented/unreliable information
(Section 4.2).
• We measure the capacity of those channels with and
without mitigations on multiple generations of re-
cent implementations of the two mainstream archi-
tectures, x86 and ARM (Section 5.2).
• We demonstrate that on each investigated processor,
there are significant residual channels that cannot be
closed with known techniques (Section 5.2).
• We find that an apparent I-cache remnant channel
on x86 as well as ARM seems to result from in-
struction prefetching (Section 5.3).
• We show that the branch target buffer on x86 pro-
vides timing channels that cannot be mitigated (Sec-
tion 5.4).
• We show the branch history buffer provides a chan-
1We use the term “operating system” in a generalised sense, refer-
ring to the most privileged software level that has full control over the
hardware. In a cloud scenario this would refer to the hypervisor, and
the term “process” would represent a virtual machine.
nel that cannot be closed on x86 platforms and on
more recent ARM platforms (Section 5.5).
• We demonstrate that flushing the TLB is insufficient
for mitigating the TLB channel on x86 (Section 5.6)
• We argue the need for a new hardware-software
contract, extending the ISA with mechanisms re-
quired to enforce confidentiality on time-shared
cores (Section 6).
Our results show that, contrary to conventional wis-
dom, intra-core timing channels remain even when using
all hardware-supported flush operations. Our results fur-
thermore show that this is not a one-off defect of a par-
ticular implementation, but affects multiple implementa-
tions of both mainstream architectures.
2 Background
2.1 Microarchitectural State and Timing
Channels
Modern processors contain a number of microarchitec-
tural features that exploit temporal or spatial locality for
improving average-case performance. Inherently, these
features hold state that depends on recent execution his-
tory and affects the performance of subsequent execu-
tion. These are the data and instruction caches, the TLB,
the branch predictor as well as code and data prefetch-
ers. The branch predictor typically caches state in two
places, the branch target buffer (BTB) and the branch
history buffer (BHB).
On a context switch, the recent history and immedi-
ate future belong to different processes (and thus poten-
tially security domains), which means that the execution
of one domain can affect the timing of the execution of
another, thus establishing a channel. In fact, timing at-
tacks have been demonstrated via all of these microar-
chitectural features, see Ge et al. [15] for a survey.
Preventing such channels requires either avoiding any
sharing of (or contention for) microarchitectural state, or
ensuring that it is reset to a defined state (independent of
execution history) on a switch of security domain, i.e.
flushing. Partitioning by the OS is generally possible
where resources are accessed by physical address (which
is under OS control); eg. the L2 and lower-level caches
can be partitioned by page colouring [25, 29, 46]. On-
core resources, such as the L1 caches, TLB and branch
predictors, are accessed by virtual address and thus can-
not be partitioned by the OS.2 In the absence of ex-
2The L1 caches on some processors are said to be physically ad-
dressed. In reality this almost always means that the set-selector bits
are a subset of the page offset, meaning that the lookup only uses ad-
dress bits that are invariant under address translation. ARM seems to
be using hardware alias-detection on at least some cores, to make the
caches be have as physically indexed.
plicit hardware support for partitioning, channels based
on such resources can only be prevented by flushing.
2.2 Covert channels
Where microarchitectural hardware state is not parti-
tioned or flushed, a Trojan can, through its own execu-
tion, force the hardware into a particular state, and a spy
can probe this state by observing its own progress against
real time. This will constitute a covert channel, i.e. an
information flow bypassing the system’s security policy
[27]. For example, the Trojan can modulate its cache
footprint, encoding data into the number of cache lines
accessed. The spy can read the data by observing the
time taken to access each cache line. Or the Trojan can
force the branch predictor state machine into a particular
state, which the spy can sense by observing the latency of
branch instructions (i.e. whether they are predicted cor-
rectly).
The actual implementations of covert channels depend
on the details of the particular microarchitectural feature
they exploit. A large number of such implementations
have been described, as surveyed by Ge et al. [15].More
such channels have been implemented and evaluated re-
cently [12, 14, 34].
The threat of microarchitectural channels is not re-
stricted to environments compromised by Trojans. A
side channel is a special case of a covert channel, which
does not depend on a colluding Trojan, but instead al-
lows a spy program to recover sensitive information from
a non-colluding victim. Where they exist, side channels
pose a serious threat to privacy and can be used to break
encryption [15].
Collusion allows better utilisation of the underlying
hardware mechanism and hence covert channels tend to
have much higher bandwidth than side channels based
on the same mechanism; the capacity of the covert chan-
nel is the upper bound of the corresponding side channel
capacity.
We focus on covert channels, as the existence of a
covert channel means that there is a potential side chan-
nel as well, particularly where the timing channel al-
lows the receiver to obtain address information from the
sender, as is the case in cache-based channels. Further-
more, closing a covert channel implicitly eliminates side
channels. For that reason we focus on covert channels
in this work, as we aim to establish the degree to which
microarchitectural timing channels can be eliminated.
Historically, covert channels were mostly discussed
within the scope of multilevel security (MLS) sys-
tems [11, 28]. Such systems have users with different
classification levels and the system is required to en-
sure that a user with a high security clearance, e.g. a
Top Secret classification, does not leak information to
users with a lower clearance. The security evaluation re-
quirements for military-style separation kernels [41] re-
quire evaluating covert channels and limiting their capac-
ity [23].
The advent of modern software deployment
paradigms, including cloud computing, app stores
and browsers executing downloaded code, increases the
risk of covert channels. Consequently, channels in such
environment have received recent attention [31, 34, 49].
Covert channels break the isolation guarantees of cloud
environments, where workloads of several users are
deployed on the same hardware. Similarly, mobile
devices rely on the system’s security policy to ensure
privacy whilst executing software of multiple, possibly
untrustworthy developers.
As indicated in the Introduction, we focus on chan-
nels that can be exploited by a Trojan and a spy who
time-share a processor core. This scenario implicitly
eliminates transient-state channels [4, 53], i.e. those that
exploit the limited bandwidth of processor components,
such as busses. These rely on concurrent execution of
Trojan and spy, and hence do not exist in a time-sharing
scenario. We thus only need to handle persistent-state
channels, which rely on competing for storage capacity
of processor elements.
2.3 Signalling techniques
Like any communication, a covert channel requires not
only a communication medium (the microarchitectural
state in our case) but also a protocol, i.e. exploitation
technique.
In this work we use the Prime+Probe technique [37,
38], which is commonly used for exploiting timing chan-
nels in set-associative caching elements. It has been ap-
plied to the L1 D-cache [37, 38], L1 I-cache [3], and
the LLC [32]. Several other techniques for exploiting
cache channels have been suggested [18, 20, 37, 51],
some of which demonstrate higher capacity. Our focus
is not the maximum potential channel capacity nor the
specific mechanism used. Instead we focus on establish-
ing the existence of channels and whether they can be
closed; and choose Prime+Probe as a generic approach
for exploiting multiple channels.
In Prime+Probe, the spy primes the cache by filling
some of the cache sets with its own data. The Trojan
uses each of the sets that the spy primes to transmit one
bit, leaving the corresponding cache line untouched for
sending a zero, or replacing it with its own data for send-
ing a one. The spy then probes the cache state to receive
the information, measuring the time taken to access the
data it primed; a long access time indicates that the Tro-
jan replaced cache content, representing a one, a short
access time a zero. We use a simplified implementation:
the input symbol is the total number of cache lines ac-
cessed by the Trojan (i.e. for simplicity we use a unary
instead of a more efficient binary encoding).
3 Threat Model
We assume that the adversary manages to execute a Tro-
jan program within a restricted security domain. For ex-
ample, the adversary may compromise a service within
the restricted domain and inject the Trojan’s code, or she
may be a corrupt developer that inserts malicious code
into a software product used in the restricted domain.
Executing within the restricted domain gives the Trojan
access to sensitive data which the adversary wants, how-
ever the security policies confine the secure environment
to prevent data exfiltration by the Trojan.
Additionally, the adversary controls a spy program
which executes on the same computer as the Trojan, for
example, in a different virtual machine or app. The spy is
executing outside the restricted domain and consequently
can communicate freely with the adversary, but it does
not have access to the sensitive data. The adversary’s
aim is to exploit a microarchitectural covert channel in
the shared hardware. If such a channel exists and is not
controlled by the system, the Trojan can use the channel
to send the sensitive data to the spy, which can then send
the data to the adversary. In this work we investigate
the degree to which the system can prevent the adversary
from exploiting such covert channels.
We are focusing on time-shared use of processors, and
thus ignore transient channels. As we are exploring mi-
croarchitectural channels, we exclude timing channels
that are controlled by software. For example, the Tro-
jan could create a timing channel by varying its execu-
tion time before yielding the processor. We note that the
system can protect against such channels by padding the
execution time of the Trojan following a yield [5, 9, 10].
Moreover, because we investigate the processor’s abil-
ity to close the channel, we only investigate channels
within the processor itself. External channels, such as the
DRAM open rows channel [40], are outside the scope of
this work.
4 Methodology
In this work we examine the level of support that manu-
facturers provide for eliminating microarchitectural tim-
ing channels in their processors. To this purpose, we im-
plement multiple covert channels, identify the processor
instructions and available information that can be used
for mitigating the channels, and measure the capacity of
the channels with and without the mitigation techniques.
These steps are described in greater details below.
4.1 Channels
Cock et al. [10] investigates efficient software mitiga-
tion techniques against microarchitectural channels on
ARM. We adopt their techniques, viewing a channel as a
pipe into which a sender (the Trojan) places inputs drawn
from some set I and which a receiver (the spy) observes
as outputs from a set O. The inputs and output sets de-
pend on the specific covert channel used.
We implement five channels, each targeting a differ-
ent microarchitectural component. But we note that the
microarchitectural features interact, so our attacks can-
not be orthogonal. For example, an attack targeting the
I-cache channel will implicitly probe the BTB, and thus
may show a channel even if the I-cache does not actually
carry state across security domains.
Except where noted we do not make any assumptions
on the virtual-address-space layout of either the Trojan or
the spy; the memory used for Prime+Probe attack may be
allocated anywhere in the virtual address space.
We target the channels exploiting the L1 I-cache, L1
D-cache, TLB, branch target buffer and branch history
buffer.
L1 data cache For attacking the D-cache [37, 38] we
use the Prime+Probe implementation from the Mastik
toolkit [50]. The input symbols enumerate the cache sets;
to send a symbol s, the Trojan reads enough data to fill
all ways of cache sets 0,1, . . . ,s−1. The spy first fills the
whole cache with its own data, waits for a context switch
(to the Trojan), and then measures the total time taken to
read a data item from each cache set; the output symbol
is the recorded time.
Note that we could use a more sophisticated encoding
of the input symbols to increase capacity. However, the
point is not to establish the maximum channel capacity,
but to investigate the degree to which it can be mitigated.
We therefore keep things as simple as possible.
L1 instruction cache The attack on the I-cache [1, 2] is
identical to the L1 D-cache channel, except that instead
of reading data, the programs execute code in memory
locations that map to specific cache sets. The implemen-
tation, also taken from the Mastik code, uses a series of
jumps.
Translation lookaside buffer For the TLB channel, the
input set enumerates the TLB entries. The Trojan sends
an input symbol, s, by reading a single integer from
each of s consecutive pages. The spy measures the time
to access a number of pages. In order to reduce self-
contention in the spy, it only accesses half of the TLB.
A more sophisticated design would take into account
the structure of the TLB and aim to target the individ-
ual associative sets, and exclude only the minimal set of
pages the spy needs for its own execution. As before, we
opt for simplicity rather than capacity.
1 #define X_4(a) a; a; a; a
2 #define X_16(a) X_4(X_4(a))
3 #define X_256(a) X_16(X_16(a))
4
5 #define JMP jnc 1f; .align 16; 1:
6
7 xorl %eax, %eax
8 X_256(JMP)
9
10 rdtscp
11 movl %eax, %esi
12 and $1, %edi
13 jz 2f
14 X_256(nop)
15 2:
16 rdtscp
17 subl %esi, %eax
Figure 1: BPU channel code for the x86 architecture.
The only prior implementation of a TLB-based chan-
nel is that of Hund et al. [22], which uses an intra-process
TLB side channel to bypass the protection of kernel ad-
dress space layout randomisation (KASLR). We are not
aware of any prior implementation of inter-process TLB
channels and past work considers such channels infeasi-
ble because the x86 TLB used to be flushed on context
switch [54]. However, recent x86 processors feature a
tagged TLB when operating in 64-bit mode, and ARM
processor TLBs have been tagged for a long time. As a
result, TLB channels are feasible on modern hardware.
Branch history buffer For exploiting the BHB we use
an approach similar to the residual state-based covert
channel of Evtyushkin et al. [13]. In each time slice,
the Trojan sends a single-bit input symbol. Trojan and
spy use the same channel code for sending and receiving.
The code, the x86 version of which is shown in Figure 1,
consists of a sequence of conditional forward branches
that are always taken (Line 8) which set the history to a
known state. The next code segment (Lines 10–17) mea-
sures the time it takes to perform a branch (Line 13) that
conditionally skips over 256 nop instructions (Line 14).
The branch outcome depends on the least significant bit
of register %edi. The return value of the code (register
%eax) is the measured time. The ARM implementation
is similar.
Because the code takes different paths depending on
whether the input bit is set, there is a timing differ-
ence between these two paths. Another source of tim-
ing difference is the processor’s prediction on whether
the branch in Line 13 is taken. The channel exploits this
timing difference.
To implement this channel, the Trojan and the spy map
the code at the same virtual address, however each uses
its own copy of the code (i.e. we do not rely on shared
memory). To send an input symbol, the Trojan sets the
least significant bit of the input register to the input sym-
bol and repeatedly calls the code throughout the time
slice. This sets a strong prediction of the branch’s out-
come. The spy, in its time slice, calls the code with the
input bit cleared (branch taken) and uses the measured
time as the output symbol.
Branch target buffer To our knowledge, no BTB-based
covert channel has been demonstrated to date. To build
the channel, we chain branch instructions into a probing
buffer. The Trojan probes on the first s instructions, the
input symbol, while the spy measures the time taken for
probing the entire buffer. On ARM platforms, the num-
ber of branch instructions equals the known size of BTB.
On x86 platforms, details of BTB are generally not spec-
ified by manufacturers, but can frequently be reverse-
engineered [35]. According to Godbolt [16], the BTB
contains 4096 entries on the Ivy Bridge microarchitec-
ture. In our test, the Trojan probes from 3072 to 5120
jmp instructions, whereas the spy probes on 4096 jmp
instructions. The jmp instructions are 16-byte aligned,
therefore the probing buffers are bigger than the L1 I-
cache (32 KiB).
4.2 Mitigations
The microarchitectural channels we examine in this work
exploit timing variations due to the internal state of com-
ponents of the processor core. The OS cannot miti-
gate by partitioning the components, as this is not sup-
ported by the hardware. Furthermore, the OS cannot
force partitioning through the allocation of physical ad-
dresses as the resources are indexed virtually. The only
mitigation strategy available is through hardware cache-
flushing mechanisms or completely disabling features.
Architectural support on x86
The wbinvd instruction invalidates all of the entries
in the processor caches [24]. Consequently, after the in-
struction executes, the caches are in a defined state, all
lines invalid, and subsequent accesses to data and in-
structions are served from memory, until program local-
ity leads to use of recently cached data/instructions.
When executing in 32-bit mode, reloading the page-
table pointer register, CR3, invalidates all of the entries in
the TLB and paging-structure caches except global map-
pings. For flushing the entries for global mappings, we
reload the CR0 register. In 64-bit mode the TLBs are
tagged with PCID, we use invpcid to flush and invali-
date both tagged and global TLB entries, including pag-
ing structure caches.
The architecture offers no instruction for flushing the
state of the prefetcher. Instead, it allows disabling the
data prefetcher by updating MSR 0x1A4 [47], which
avoids any shared state in this unit. However, there is
no way to disable instruction prefetching.
In summary, on x86 we can flush all caches and the
TLBs and disable the data prefetcher. We cannot clean or
disable the instruction prefetcher or the branch predictor.
Architectural support on ARM
We use the DCCISW cache maintenance operation for
invalidating the data cache and ICIALLU for the instruc-
tion cache. Because the L2 cache is normally imple-
mented as a core-external cache, operations on that cache
are not part of the ARM ISA, and we therefore use the
appropriate manufacturer-specified operations on exter-
nal cache controllers to invalidate cache ways. On the
Sabre (A9) platform, we use the clean and invalidate set
operations. On the Hikey (A53) and TX1 (A57) plat-
forms, we use DCCISW and ICIALLU for flushing the L2
caches, which are the same operations as used for flush-
ing the L1 caches, but targeted at a different cache level.
On all ARM processors we use TLBIALL to invalidate
the entire unified TLB and BPIALL to invalidate all en-
tries from branch predictors. On ARMv7, we disable
branch prediction by clearing the Z-field in the SCTLR
register; this operation is not supported on ARMv8.
On the A9 we disable the L1-data prefetch by setting
the ACTLR register. On the A53, we disable the data
prefetcher by setting the CPU auxiliary control register.
In summary, on ARM we can flush all caches,
branch prediction entries, and TLBs and disable the data
prefetcher (except on the A57). On the A9 we disable the
branch prediction. None of the ARM platforms allow us
to flush or disable the instruction prefetcher.
Scrubbing state without architectural support
Where the architecture does not support flushing or
disabling a stateful microarchitectural feature, the oper-
ating system can attempt to programmatically reset its
state during a domain switch. For example, the con-
text switch code can fill the L1 D-cache with kernel data,
ensuring that the contents of the cache does not depend
on prior computation. This approach is severely limited
by the insufficient documentation of relevant microar-
chitectural features. While researchers have reverse-
engineered some of these features [33, 35, 39, 52] or
the algorithm used [8, 19, 48], the available information
is still insufficient. Hence, any defences that depend on
such undocumented microarchitectural properties are in-
herently brittle and may fail to work as soon as a new
version of the processor hits the market. We therefore do
not use such techniques, as our aim is to investigate the
degree to which microarchitectural timing channels can
be reliably closed.
4.3 Measuring the channel capacity
To establish whether there is a channel, we configure the
Trojan to send a pseudo-random sequence of input sym-
bols. The spy collects the output symbols; a channel ex-
ists if the distribution of output symbols depends on the
input symbol.
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Figure 2: Channel matrix for the unmitigated L1-I covert
channel on an ARM Cortex-A9. Colours indicate the
probability of observing a particular output (total time
in cycles for probing the buffer) for a particular input
symbol (the number of cache sets the Trojan’s code
executes), as per the scale on the right. This exam-
ple uses 909 samples for each input symbol and shows
a channel capacity of 4 bits, we summarise this as
n= ,C = .b.
4.3.1 The channel matrix
We use the technique of Cock et al. [10] to measure the
information capacity of a channel. That is, we first create
a channel matrix, which specifies the conditional proba-
bility of an observed output symbol given an input sym-
bol. For example, Figure 2 shows the channel matrix we
observe from the L1 I-cache of an ARM Cortex-A9 pro-
cessor without any countermeasures (see Section 5.1 for
description of the hardware platform). As we can see,
there is a strong correlation between the input symbol
(number of cache sets that the Trojan occupies after each
run) and the output symbol (total time to jump through
every cache line in a cache-sized buffer), resulting in a
strong channel. In the absence of a channel the graph
would show no horizontal variation.
4.3.2 Channel capacity
As a measure of the channel capacity, we calculate the
Shannon capacity [45], denoted by C , from the chan-
nel matrix. C indicates the average number of bits of
information that a computationally unbounded receiver
can learn from each input symbol. For the channel ma-
trix in Figure 2 we find that C = 4.0 b. Because the
Trojan sends one of 257 possible values (0 · · ·256), the
maximum capacity expected is theoretically 8.0 bits per
symbol. The observed capacity is smaller than the max-
imum due to sampling error, which leads to a distribu-
tion of output values even if there was a unique mapping
from input to output symbols. Observable capacity could
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Figure 4: Average probe times, with 95% confidence in-
tervals, for the mitigated L1-I covert channel on ARM
Cortex-A9.
also be reduced through undocumented interference by
other hardware features, such as replacement policy or
prefetching.
4.3.3 Channel bandwidth
The channel bandwidth can now be calculated by mul-
tiplying the capacity by the input symbol rate, i.e. the
frequency with which the Trojan can send different sym-
bols. As the processor is time-shared between the Trojan
and the spy, the Trojan can send at most one symbol per
time slice. In the case of Figure 2 we use a time slice
of 1 ms, meaning that per second the Trojan gets 500 op-
portunities to send a symbol, as the two processes run in
alternating time slices. The potential bandwidth of the
channel is therefore 500×4 = 2,000 b/s. We use differ-
ent time slices on the various platforms, as specified in
Table 1.
Much higher bandwidths have been demonstrated in
the literature [12, 20, 32, 34]. One reason for our rel-
atively low bandwidth is that our channel is between
programs that time-share a processor, whereas the other
channels were observed between concurrently executing
processes, allowing for a much higher symbol transfer
rate. Furthermore, as indicated in Section 4.1, we use
an unsophisticated encoding, where the input is simply
the number of cache sets accessed, resulting in 257 pos-
sible values. Instead we could map each bit of the input
symbol’s binary representation onto a cache set, result-
ing in 2256 values and a theoretical maximum capacity
of 256 bits per symbol (although the actually achievable
capacity would be much smaller, given the spread of the
distribution). Instead of aiming for maximum capacity,
our channels are designed to facilitate analysis.
4.3.4 Visualising low-capacity channels
Visualising the channel matrix as a heat map is useful for
presenting the wealth of information that the matrix con-
tains. However, for low-capacity channels, such a repre-
sentation may fail to highlight the channel. For example,
when mitigating the L1-I-cache channel on the A9 us-
ing methods for flushing and invalidating all caches (Sec-
tion 4.2), we obtain the channel matrix of Figure 3. There
is no channel evident, but the picture is fuzzy enough to
hide a small channel of 0.7 b, about a sixth of the original
capacity.
For better visualisation we compress the information
of the channel matrix by averaging the output symbols
for each input set, which yields the graph of Figure 4.
We now clearly see the residual channel, with a clear dif-
ference between the average output symbol for small vs.
large input values.
4.3.5 Verifying low-capacity channels
A challenge for our channel capacity measurement is that
it is based on a sampled distribution. Sampling errors
may result in an apparent non-zero channel, even when
in reality there is no channel. Consequently, when the
computed channel capacity C is low, we need to de-
termine whether we observe a low-capacity channel or
just sampling noise. For example, while Figure 4 clearly
shows that there is a residual channel, even in the av-
eraged graph it might not be obvious whether there is
a channel or just sampling noise; we need a systematic
way of detecting a statistically significant channel with-
out relying on visual inspection. Specifically, we need to
distinguish between the null hypothesis, that states that
there is no channel, i.e. the distribution of output symbols
is independent of the input symbols, and the alternative
hypothesis that there is a channel.
Following Cock et al. [10], we bound the effect of
sampling error by simulated sampling of a true zero-
capacity channel. Specifically, we randomly distribute
the output symbols collected across all input symbols and
measure the capacity of this simulated channel. We re-
peat the process 1000 times, generating 1000 simulated
capacities. If our measured sample (Figure 4) is drawn
from a single distribution (i.e. no channel), there is a high
likelihood that some of the simulated capacities would
be higher than the observed C . Thus, if C is bigger than
the maximum, C0, of the 1000 simulated capacities, the
probability that the sample is drawn from a single distri-
bution is less than 0.1% and we reject the null hypothesis.
Table 1: Experimental hardware, covering 2–3 generations of microarchitectures across x86 and ARM. I-TLB and
D-TLB represent first-level TLBs, L2 TLB represents the second-level (unified) TLB. “?” indicates unknown values.
Architecture x86 x86 x86 ARMv7 ARMv8 ARMv8
Microarchitecture Sandy Br Haswell Skylake A9 A53 A57
Manufacturer Intel Intel Intel Freescale HiSilicon NVIDIA
Processor i7-2600 E3-1220 v3 i7-6700 i.MX6 Kirin 620 Jetson TX1
Clock rate (GHz) 3.4 3.1 3.4 0.8 1.2 1.91
Year 2012 2013 2015 2012 2014 2015
Address size (bit) 32 or 64 32 or 64 32 or 64 32 32 or 64 32 or 64
Execution order OoO OoO OoO OoO InO OoO
Time slice (ms) 1 1 1 2 3 3
L1-D size (KiB) 32 32 32 32 32 32
line (B) 64 64 64 32 64 64
sets×assoc. 64×8 64×8 64×8 256×4 128×4 256×2
L1-I size (KiB) 32 32 32 32 32 48
line (B) 64 64 64 32 64 64
sets×assoc. 64×8 64×8 64×8 256×4 256×2 256×3
L2 size (KiB) 256 256 256 1024 512 2048
line (B) 64 64 64 32 64 64
sets×assoc. 512×8 512×8 512×8 2048×16 512×16 2048×16
L3 size (MiB) 8 8 8 N×A N×A N×A
line (B) 64 64 64 N×A N×A N×A
sets×assoc. 8192×16 8192×16 8192×16 N×A N×A N×A
BTB size ? ? ? 512 256 256
sets×assoc. ? ? ? 256×2 ? ?
I-TLB size 128 128 128 32 10 48
sets×assoc. 32×4 16×8 16×8 32×1 10×1 48×1
D-TLB size 64 64 64 32 10 32
sets×assoc. 16×4 16×4 16×4 32×1 10×1 32×1
L2 TLB size 512 1024 1536 128 512 1024
sets×assoc. 128×4 128×8 128×12 64×2 128×4 256×4
Otherwise, we conclude that we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis and that the test is inconclusive (i.e. consistent
with no channel).
In the case of Figure 3, we find that of the observed
capacity C = 0.7 b, at most C0 = 0.38 b can be attributed
to sampling error, meaning that we have a true residual
channel of at least C = 0.3b. Given the 1 kHz context-
switching rate, this implies a residual bandwidth of at
least 150 b/s, enough to leak a typical RSA key in less
than half a minute.
5 Results
5.1 Evaluation platforms
We examine processors from the two most widely-used
architectures, x86 and ARM. For x86 these are the
Sandy Bridge, Haswell and Skylake microarchitectures.
For ARM we use a Cortex-A9, an implementation of
ARMv7, and a Cortex-A53 and A57, in-order (InO) and
out-of-order (OoO) implementations of ARMv8, the lat-
est version of the architecture. We summarise their rele-
vant features in Table 1. Note that the information on the
branch predictors are incomplete, as there is very limited
information available.
As we are probing hardware properties, the results
should be independent of the OS or hypervisor used.
However, the more complex the code base, the more
complicated and error-prone it is to implement mitiga-
tions. Furthermore, with a large system, such as Linux
or Xen, it becomes harder to preclude interference from
various software components. We therefore use the seL4
microkernel [26, 44], which is a small (about 10,000
lines of code) and simple system. Furthermore, seL4’s
comprehensive formal verification includes proof of free-
dom from storage channels [36], which means any re-
maining channels must be timing channels, simplifying
analysis of results.
Specifically, we use the separation kernel [42] config-
uration of seL4, where we run our Trojan and spy code
“bare metal”, with no actual OS services. This means
that we are working in an almost noise-free environment,
which helps measuring small-capacity channels.
5.2 Overview of results
Raw channels
The “none” rows in Table 2 show the unmitigated
channel capacities of all the channels we test across our
six processors. We see that most of the channels leak
several bits per input symbol. The main exceptions are
the I-cache channel on the recent x86 processors and the
Table 2: Observed unmitigated (“none”) and maximally mitigated (“full”) channel capacities C and maximum appar-
ent capacities for empty channel C0 in bits. Channels that cannot be mitigated with all hardware-provided operations
are marked in red.
Processor Sandy Bridge Haswell Skylake A9 A53 A57
Chan. Mitig. 32-bit 32-bit 64-bit 64-bit 32-bit 32-bit 32-bit
L1-D none 4.0 4.1 4.7 3.3 5.0 2.8 N/Mfull 0.038 (0.025) 0.083 (0.050) 0.43 (0.24) 0.18 (0.01) 0.11 (0.046) 0.15 (0.079) N/M
L1-I none 3.7 0.65 0.46 0.37 4.0 4.5 6full 0.85 (0.05) 0.25 (0.04) 0.36 (0.1) 0.18 (0.09) 1.0 (0.72) 0.5 (0.24) 2.8 (0.34)
TLB none 3.2 3.1 3.2 2.5 0.33 3.4 N/Mfull 0.47 (0.29) 0.37 (0.23) 0.18 (0.1) 0.11 (0.06) 0.16 (0.087) 0.14 (0.08) N/M
BHB none 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 N/Mfull 1.0 (0.023) 1.0 (0.009) 1.0 (0.002) 1.0 (0.002) 0.009 (0.008) 0.5 (0.02) N/M
BTB none 2.0 4.6 4.1 1.8 1.1 1.3 N/Mfull 1.7 (1.2) 1.3 (0.4) 1.6 (0.5) 1.9 (1.2) 0.068 (0.032) 0.15 (0.08) N/M
TLB channel on the A9, which have capacities in the
range of 0.33–0.65 bits. We do not know the reasons
for these lower capacities, but suspect that replacement
policies might reduce the capacity seen by our simple at-
tack, which works best with true LRU. A more sophisti-
cated implementation, taking into account the (reverse-
engineered) replacement policy, might show a bigger
channel.
The main take-away from these results is that all mi-
croarchitectural features that cache recent execution his-
tory can be used for timing channels. This unsurprising
result confirms that all such features must be taken into
account when trying to stop timing-channel leakage.
Mitigated channels
The “full” rows in Table 2 show the observed channel
capacities with all mitigations enabled. This goes beyond
just flushing caches, but using all mitigations discussed
in Section 4.2; we will discuss specific examples below.
From the table we make the surprising observation that
none of the channels are completely closed by em-
ploying all available hardware functions for remov-
ing the microarchitectural state. All observed channels
are larger than the statistical bound allowed by the null
hypothesis. In fact, for each processor we find at least
one channel that leaks over half a bit per symbol (which
translates into a bandwidth of hundreds of bits per sec-
ond).
While all residual channels are statistically significant,
we highlight (in red font) the cases where the observed
capacity is well above the sampling accuracy or where
we can see from the visual representation that there is a
definite channel.
In some cases the explanation for the remaining chan-
nels is straightforward. For example, Intel architectures
do not support any method of clearing the state of the
BPU. Consequently, the branch prediction channel re-
mains unchanged even when we enable all of the pro-
tection provided by the processor (Section 5.5). In other
cases the story is more intricate. We will explore some
of them in more depth.
5.3 Finding 1: I-cache channel persists on
all platforms
In particular, the L1-I cache channel remains even with
all mitigation method enabled on all the testing plat-
forms. This seems particularly surprising, as one would
expect that a full cache flush should be sufficient to re-
move this channel. We pick one microarchitecture from
each ISA to explore further.
5.3.1 A9 I-cache channel
We have already done a partial examination of the A9’s
I-cache channel, when we used it as an example in Sec-
tion 4.3. Recall that Figure 2 showed a clear linear cor-
relation between input and output symbols. Recall fur-
ther that a clear channel remained when invalidating the
cache on context switches, as evidenced by the clear tran-
sition between two distinct distribuions in Figure 4.
On the A9, the distance between two addresses that
map to the same cache set, known as the cache stride
(and equal to the cache size divided by associativity), is
8 KiB. Clearly, the transition in Figure 4 occurs at 4 KiB,
which matches the page size. This may indicate that the
channel originates not from the cache itself, but from
some part of the virtual memory unit, for example, from
the TLB. Hence, clearing the TLB might eliminate this
channel.
We next apply all of the countermeasures available on
the A9, including TLB flush, which yields the average
probing cost shown in Figure 5. Clearly, despite using
everything the hardware gives us, there is still a sig-
nificant channel: Input values smaller than 14 result in
below-average output symbols, whereas symbols in the
range 15-50 produce above-average output.
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Figure 5: Average probe times, with 95% confidence in-
tervals, for the L1-I I covert channel on A9 with all miti-
gations. n= ,C = .b,C = .b.
One possible explanation for the channel is that the
processor maintains some state that is not cleared by
flushing the caches and is not deactivated when disabling
the data prefetcher. An alternative explanation is that the
state is maintained outside the processor, for example re-
sulting from a DRAM open-row channel [40].
To investigate further, we use the performance mon-
itoring unit (PMU) to count the instruction-cache-
dependent stall cycles (Figure 6). We observe that the
stall cycles show the same trend for small input values as
the probe cost of Figure 5. As these instruction depen-
dent stalls are triggered by internal processor state, we
can conclude that the channel is not (solely) caused by
core-external features.
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Figure 6: Average instruction cache dependent stall cy-
cles with 95% confidence intervals for A9 with all miti-
gations.
A53 We similarly use the PMU to analyse the cause of
the residual timing channel on the A53. We find that
the number of L1 I-cache refills increases as the probing
timing decreases (graph omitted for space reasons).
A possible explanation is that the state of instruction
prefetcher, which cannot be disabled, might be affected
by the Trojan. Because there is no official documentation
on the implementation of the instruction prefetcher, we
cannot investigate further.
5.3.2 Sandy Bridge I-cache channel
Figure 7 shows that without countermeasure this chan-
nel behaves like expected (and qualitatively similar to
the A9). Again, flushing the cache is only moderately ef-
fective, reducing the capacity by not even 65%, although
the channel matrix looks quite different, as shown in Fig-
ure 8.
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Figure 7: Channel matrix for the L1-I covert
channel on Sandy Bridge without countermeasures.
n= ,C = .b.
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Figure 8: Channel matrix for the L1-I covert chan-
nel on Intel Sandy Bridge with cache invalidation.
n= ,C = .b.
If we apply our remaining countermeasures, flushing
the TLB and disabling the data prefetcher, a distinct
channel remains, with a capacity of just under a quarter
of the original, as shown in Figure 9. The PMU shows
that the number of instruction cache, streaming buffer
and victim cache misses (ICACHE.MISSES) increases
as the probing time decreases. Again, this rules out core-
external effects and makes us suspect contention between
Trojan and spy on some unknown instruction prefetcher.
A potential alternative explanation is that the cache-
flush operation does not operate as advertised. As in-
structions are normally read only, the I-cache is normally
coherent with memory and does not need flushing. Could
it be that the hardware is taking a shortcut and does not
actually invalidate the I-cache?
To test this hypothesis we change our exploit code
to re-write the probing buffer (a chain of jumps) before
flushing the cache (using clflush). This makes the
I-cache incoherent with memory, leaving the hardware
no choice but perform the actual flush when requested.
However, the residual timing channel remains on both
64-bit Haswell (C = 0.2 b, C0= 0.03 b) and Skylake ma-
chines (C = 0.2 b, C0 = 0.06 b); graphs not shown for
space reasons.
 60000
 61000
 62000
 63000
 64000
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60
O
ut
pu
t (c
yc
les
)
Input (sets)
datafile using 1:2:3
 0.001
 0.01
Figure 9: Channel matrix for the L1-I chan-
nel on Sandy Bridge with all mitigations.
n= ,C = .b,C = .b.
5.4 Finding 2: BTB channel cannot be mit-
igated on x86
The I-cache results in Table 2 were obtained in a setup
where the Trojan and spy had their buffers of chained
jmp instructions allocated at the same virtual address.
As far as the I-cache is concerned, the actual virtual ad-
dresses should not matter, as long as the buffers are con-
tiguous in the virtual address space.
To investigate further, we change the setup to use
different virtual address ranges for the two buffers
(0x2c94000 in the Trojan, 0x2c82000 in the spy), result-
ing in a stronger channel, as visualised in Figure 10. This
could be an effect caused by contention in the branch pre-
dictor, or some prefetcher, as discussed in Section 5.3.2.
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Figure 10: Channel matrix for the L1-I channel using dif-
ferent virtual addresses on Skylake with all mitigations.
n= ,C = .b,C = .b.
In fact, Table 2 shows clear BTB channels on all plat-
forms. They are particularly strong on the x86 proces-
sors, despite this being a black-box attack, given the
complete lack of documentation of the x86 BTBs. An at-
tack based on some understanding of the BTB implemen-
tations would likely show even bigger channels. Also,
there is no architectural support for flushing these chan-
nels. Figure 11 shows an example (on Haswell) of this
very definite channel with all mitigations deployed.
5.5 Finding 3: Branch-history-buffer
channel persists
We now turn our attention to the BHB channel. Recall
from Section 4.1 that the this channel only has two input
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Figure 11: Average probing times, with 95% confidence
intervals for the BTB channel on 64-bit Haswell with all
mitigations. n= ,C = .b,C = .b.
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Figure 12: Distribution of output values for input values
in the branch prediction channel on Skylake, with and
without mitigations. The zero curves are indistinguish-
able.
values, 0 and 1, corresponding to a branch taken and not
taken. Clearly, the maximun possible capacity of this
channel is 1 b.
5.5.1 Skylake BHB channel
Figure 12 shows the distribution of output values for
these inputs without and with mitigations on Skylake.
We first observe that for both cases, the distribution of
the output symbols for inputs 0 and 1 are clearly distinct.
For the non-mitigated case, the median output value for
input 0 is 32 cycles, whereas the median output for in-
put 1 is 42. Applying all mitigation (none of which tar-
get the BHB specifically, as the architecture provides no
mechanism) changes access times. However, the output
values for inputs 0 and 1 are now even more separated
than in the case of no mitigation, with median output val-
ues being 32 and 52, respectively. In short, our mitigation
attempts are completely ineffective on the BHB channel.
5.5.2 A53 BHB channel
Figure 13 shows for the A53 that without mitigation, the
median outputs are 18 cycles and 24 cycles for inputs 0
and 1, respectively. With mitigation, including invalidat-
ing branch prediction entries (BPIALL), the median out-
puts are 202 cycles for both inputs, but the well-defined
minima of the distributions are 150 vs. 156 cycles, pro-
ducing a clear residual channel.
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Figure 13: Distribution of output values for input values
in the BHB channel on the A53, with and without miti-
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5.6 Finding 4: TLB flushing is insufficient
for removing the x86 TLB channel
We finally turn our attention to the TLB, which, accord-
ing to Table 2, has a very distinct channel (2.5 bits). Be-
cause the TLB entries are tagged with address space ID,
the timing reveals the L1 TLB contention. For testing the
effectiveness of TLB flush by using invpcid, we explic-
itly flush all the TLB entries including paging caches. As
Figure 14 shows, a strong channel remains, in fact, the
capacity is almost unaffected by the flush.
The reason is presumably that the x86 architecture
caches TLB entries in the data cache. When applying all
mitigations listed in Section 4.2, the channel is mostly
closed as shown in Figure 15. While C is still about
twice C0, both are quite small, and from Figure 15 it
seems that the remnant channel would be hard to exploit.
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Figure 14: Channel matrix for the TLB covert channel
on Skylake with TLB flushing. n= ,C = .b.
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Figure 15: Average probing times, with 95% confidence
intervals for the TLB covert channel on Skylake with all
mitigations. n= ,C = .b,C = .b.
6 Discussion
Our results clearly show that many microarchitectural
features aimed at improving average-case performance
produce high-capacity timing channels that cannot be
closed with any available countermeasures, including
those often suggested for mitigating the exact channels
we explore [17, 37, 54], and despite some of them being
prohibitively expensive [17, 21]. As we indicated earlier,
we do not build the channels for maximum capacity, and
further engineering is likely result in even higher capac-
ities. Moreover, for high-security systems, even chan-
nels with capacities below one bit per second may pose a
threat. For example, the Orange Book [11] recommends
that channels with a bandwidth above 0.1 bits per second
are audited.
The root of the problem is that many microarchi-
tectural features either explicitly cache recent execu-
tion history (e.g. branch target buffers), or accumulate
state based on such history (prefetcher state machines).
Whenever such state is preserved across a context switch,
a timing channel will result.
The OS has no mechanisms to mitigate such channels
without hardware support. Specifically, to prevent timing
channels, the OS must be given the opportunity to either
cleanly partition such state between security domains,
or flush on every switch of security domain. Partition-
ing is easily achieved with large physically-addressed
caches through page colouring [25, 29, 46], but is prob-
ably not feasible for the virtually-addressed on-core re-
sources. Hence, there must be architected mechanisms
for flushing all history-dependent on-core state.
Obviously, such mechanisms should not affect perfor-
mance where they are not needed, and the performance
impact should be minimised where they are deployed.
For example, the x86 architecture provides no archi-
tected mechanism for selectively flushing the L1 caches,
the only cache-flush operation, wbinvd, flushes the com-
plete cache hierarchy. From the security point of view,
this is complete overkill, as the OS can easily partition
caches other than the L1. In contrast, flushing just the L1
caches on a partition switch, i.e. at a rate of no more than
1000 Hz, will have no appreciable performance impact,
as the direct and indirect costs of the flush should be in
the microsecond range, and no L1 content is likely to be
hot after a context switch.
Similarly, direct and indirect cost of flushing branch
predictors and prefetchers should be negligible, provided
efficient hardware support is available.
One way to look at our results is to argue that the ISA,
the traditional hardware-software contract, is insufficient
for building truly secure systems. The ISA is sufficient to
build software that is functionally correct but it is insuffi-
cient for building software that is secure, i.e. able to pre-
serve confidentiality in the presence of untrusted code.
Arguably, for security we need a new hardware-software
contract that contains enough information about microar-
chitecture to ensure secure partitioning or time-sharing.
7 Conclusions
We investigated intra-core covert timing channels in mul-
tiple generations of x86 and ARM processors, and found
that all investigated platforms exhibited high-capacity
channels that cannot be closed with any known mech-
anism, irrespective of cost.
We therefore have to conclude that modern main-
stream processors are not suitable for security-critical
uses where confidentiality must be preserved on a pro-
cessor core that is time-multiplexed between different se-
curity domains.
This work only explores the tip of the iceberg. We
have limited ourselves to intra-core channels in a time-
sharing scenario. In doing that we ignored all transient-
state covert channels attacks and all attacks that rely on
state outside the processor. Furthermore, the hardware
contention caused by shared buses remain a serious se-
curity risk for threads sharing a platform.
The inevitable conclusion is that security is a losing
game until the hardware manufacturers get serious about
it and provide the right mechanisms for securely manag-
ing shared processor state. This will require additions
to the ISA that allow any shared state to be either parti-
tioned or flushed.
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